INSTEAD OF AN INTRODUCTION: A SHORT OVERVIEW OF DISSONANT VOICES ON MODES OF LIABILITY
From the outset, the ICC made it clear that when it came to modes of liability it would not follow the well-established path taken by its predecessors, ad hoc tribunals and, in particular, the ICTY. In its early decisions, the Court manifestly rejected the (in)famous JCE theory 1 , and the dominant common law approach to perpetration liability. The ICC's relatively consistent hierarchical reading of the modes of liability, coupled with its strong reliance on control theory, originally embedded in the German doctrine, has divided the legal profession by attracting both appraisal and fierce criticism. While some authors dismiss only the 'control of the crime' approach 2 , others reject the differential approach from the outset and advocate the unitary approach.
3
For a while it seemed that the critics remained 'on the outside', unable to reshape the ICC's early jurisprudence on co-perpetration and participation.
However, concerns about the 'correct' interpretation of the modes of liability Due to the malleability of the concept of joint criminal enterprise, its acronym JCE has ironically been interpreted to mean 'just convict everyone'. See, e.g., M. E. Badar, '"Just Convict Everyone" -Joint Perpetration from Tadić to Stakić and Back Again ', 2006 International Criminal Law Review, no. 6, pp. 293-302 Fulford, found the 'control of the crime' theory to be inconsistent with it.
In particular, she rejected control theory's treatment of the common plan as an objective element, the idea that for joint perpetration it suffices that an accused only makes a contribution to a broadly defined common plan and not the crime itself, as well as the requirement of an 'essential' contribution. She further held that Article 25(3) did not create a hierarchy of blameworthiness nor did it allow joint perpetration and indirect perpetration to be combined as 'indirect co-perpetration'.
7
These two separate, yet concurring opinions have led other judges to assert that the interpretation of Article 25(3) is "far from being uncontentious or settled". 8 While that may be the case, after scrutinizing the hierarchical structure of Article 25(3) as well as the hitherto dominant 'control of the crime' paradigm, this article argues that both should be confirmed by the Appeal
Chamber and continued to be applied by the ICC. The interpretation of particular elements of certain modes of liability may need further clarification and fine-tuning, but that does not mean that control theory itself should be wholly rejected. Ibid., para. 17. 
INTERPRETATIVE METHODOLOGY AND APPLICABLE LAW

Other sources of applicable law
The secondary and tertiary sources of law described in Article 21 (1) As far as general principles of law are concerned, given the diversity of national legal systems in relation to defining modes of liability and punishing two or more persons who contribute to a crime in different ways, the role of general principles in interpreting modes of liability will likely be limited. 22 Finally, even though the Court is not bound by its earlier decisions, it may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions (Article 21(2)).
23
In fact, the Court has already done so on a number of occasions. 24 Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 508.
21
See supra note 13.
22
There is a wealth of literature pointing to that conclusion. See, e.g., A. The provision does not make a difference between decisions of pre-trial, trial and appeals chambers. vision contributes to the development of a consistent and predictable body of international criminal law and thus serves the principle of legality. 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORIAL LIABI-LITY AND THE ISSUE OF A HIERARCHY OF BLAMEWORTHINESS
The question of whether the Statute should be interpreted as providing for a differentiated and hierarchical system, which clearly distinguishes different forms of participation already at the level of imputation, has been seen as crucial for interpreting the modes of liability themselves. On the one hand, the Court has so far rather continuously relied on the distinction between principal liability (described in Article 25(3)(a)) and accessorial liability (described in 25 (3) The mere fact that there may be some overlapping of some subsections of Article 25(3), foremost between ordering and committing through another person, does not militate against the distinction but, on the contrary, calls for an interpretation which helps to avoid such an overlap and the resulting redundancy. 32 Along the same lines, the ECHR has emphasized that a provision must be interpreted and applied 'in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory'. It further endorsed systematic interpretation when it stressed that the Convention must be read 'as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions'.
33
Another argument in favour of the principal-accessory dichotomy, as pointed out by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga judgment, can be found in the derivative nature of modes of liability described in Article 25(3)(b) to (d). a reasonable chance to convict the most responsible'. 38 The OTP has also made public its internal policy decision to prosecute even lower level perpetrators where their conduct has been particularly grave and has acquired extensive notoriety. That approach will, it is hoped, be more cost-effective than having unsuccessful or no prosecutions against the highest placed perpetrators. 39 In light of this strategy, distinguishing between different categories of principals and between principals and accessories seems even more important.
However, some scholars claim that adherence to differentiated modes of liability reduces the expressive value of international trials since different modes of liability are unlikely to be fully comprehended within the national jurisdictions in which the crimes took place.
40 Indeed, some domestic criminal law systems do not place an emphasis on the distinction between principles and accessories, at least not before the sentencing stage. Still, the distinction between perpetrators or principals on the one side and accessories or secondary parties, on the other, has been embraced by most national criminal justice systems. 41 It is therefore legitimate to maintain that a sophisticated understanding of the defendant's relation to the offence is necessary to fulfil the expressive function of international criminal law. Making clear who the 'real' culprit is, i.e. referring to those who masterminded the crimes as principals, is important in communication with victims and carries the denunciatory and educational function.
42 This is also in line with the so-called principle of fair labelling. 43 In the context of the inherently collective nature of international crimes it may be seen as particularly important to ascertain the specific role of each participant. The Statute itself does not explicitly provide that the mode of responsibility should influence the determination of a sentence, whereas under Rule of Procedure and Evidence 145(1)(c) the degree of participation of the convicted person is specified as only one of the relevant factors that should be taken into account. This seems to be the main argument of the majority in Katanga case for rejecting the hierarchical relationship between different forms of participation described in Art. The ICTY has explicitly considered only aiding and abetting as a lesser form of liability, which as a matter of principle attracts reduced sentences.
50
This has led some scholars to accept the hierarchical relation, i.e. lesser blameworthiness in the ICC framework only with regard to Article 25(3)(c). Kai Ambos recently departed from his own, similar view that the wording "in any other way" implies a lower threshold of objective contribution in comparison to Art. 25(3)(c). He now argues that, in substance, both subparagraphs (c) and (d) provide for assistance liability and while both modes of liability may be seen as less blameworthy than liability of (co)perpetrators described in subparagraph (a), further distinction between (c) and (d) 
THE PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRE-TING MODES OF LIABILITY
Rejecting objective and subjective theories of perpetration
The ICC has so far consistently relied on the 'control of the crime' concept as a decisive factor for distinguishing between perpetrators and accessories. 59 Therefore, the control over the crime approach, at least to some extent, emerges from the endorsement of the dualist approach. That is to say, according to the Court neither subjective nor objective theories can offer a reasonable explanation and coherent framework for differentiating between different modes of liability.
60
The Court has rejected objective theories, which generally restrict the category of principals to those who physically carry out the actus reus of an offence, based on the fact that the Statute clearly classifies as perpetrators those who commit a crime through another person (Article 25(3)(a)).
61 At the same time, the Court has declined to follow the subjective approach and its manifestation in the ICTY case law, the concept of joint criminal enterprise -reasoning that the degree of contribution to a crime, and not the state of mind, should be a central element in determining the liability of principals. It has further relied on the distinction between Article 25(3)(a) and (d), arguing that had the drafters of the Statute opted for a subjective approach to distinguish between principals and accessories, those described in Article 25(3)(d) would be considered principals and not accessories to a crime, which was clearly not the case due to the explicit residual nature of that mode of liability.
62 In addition, as the Court reiterated, the 'control of the crime' paradigm represents a plausible Obviously, this is not a valid argument for Judge Fulford, who rejects the dualist reading from the outset.
61
The term 'commission' is generally considered as synonymous with 'perpetration'. On that point see Schabas, supra note 18, p. 427.
62
The Court also compared Article 25(3)(d) with the concept of joint criminal enterprise.
normative theory to hold responsible as perpetrators those participants who may have been remote from the scene of the crime, but still masterminded its commission, i.e. decided whether and how the offence would be committed.
63
Finally, the Court seems to have relied on subsidiary sources of law when it found the control theory to be widely recognized and applied in a number of legal systems and supported in the modern legal doctrine.
64 Yet it remains unclear if the Court was implying that the theory formed part of international customary law or the general principles of law, as well as whether it referred to the doctrine in an attempt to establish the existence of 'teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law' in the sense of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. Perhaps it could be argued that the Court implicitly found the 'control of the crime' concept to be rooted in a literal, systematic and contextual interpretation of the Statute in light of its object and purpose.
65 Yet, others disagree, claiming that nothing in the text of the Statute or in its drafting history suggests that the Statute codified this theory.
66 In addition, it is contended that if subsidiary sources are to be relied upon at all 67 , they should be interpreted as an argument in favour of subjective theories, as will be explained below.
Whereas the dismissal of purely objective theories can find quite strong support on the basis of a textual and structural interpretation of the Statute, foremost due to the fact that a crime can be committed through another blameworthy person (Article 25(3)(a)), the rejection of subjective theories needs to be further scrutinized because it largely depends on the interpretation of 63 Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 11, para. 920; Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 485; Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 26, para. 330.
64
Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 485 with further references in footnote 647. On the other hand, Trial Chamber II in the same case later emphasized that whether the theory is recognized in various national laws is not decisive as the Court must foremost apply its own statute. See Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 49, para. 1395.
65
This would seem to be the position of the Trial Chamber II in Katanga case, when it found control over the crime theory to represent the guiding principle inherent in Art. 25(3), which makes the distinction between perpetrators of a crime and their accomplices effective and allows all the relevant provisions of this Article relating to individual criminal responsibility to produce their full effect. Ibid.
66
Comp. van Sliedregt, supra note 29, page 86. Separate opinion of Judge Fulford, supra note 5, para. 6 et seq.; Concurrent Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 7, para. 30.
67
Advocating a cautious approach in this regard, Concurrent Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, ibid., para 17.
Article 25(3)(d). Some scholars argue that Article 25(3)(d) is not a manifestation of or a similar form to JCE, but a variation of aiding and abetting, namely, aiding and abetting group criminality and not individual criminality.
68 The motivation behind this assertion lies in the proposition that if Article 25(3) (d) does not codify JCE, the ICC would be free to import it into Article 25(3) (a).
69 Indeed, the two concepts cannot be completely equated. To start with, Article 25(3)(d) surely does not incorporate JCE III because it does not provide for dolus eventualis. 70 In addition, if the dualist interpretation of Article 25(3) is accepted, as proposed in the previous section, Article 25(3)(d), unlike JCE, cannot be seen as a form of perpetration, but participation, i.e. accessorial liability. 71 Another major difference between the JCE and Article 25(3)(d) responsibility, it has been advanced, is that a defendant under Article 25(3)(d) does not have to be a member of a group sharing a criminal purpose, but may be an outsider who assists others who are acting with a common purpose.
72
This allows the conclusion that the mode of liability described in Article 25(3) (d) is simply another form of aiding and abetting -aiding and abetting group criminality, instead of that of an individual. 73 The last argument, however, is not convincing. Reducing Article 25(3)(d) to a simple variant of aiding and abetting would render it redundant because the objective threshold prescribed in Article 25(3)(c) is already very low. 74 Moreover, Article 25(3)(d) makes no reference to an inside or outside status at all and, in any case, accomplice liability is not predicated on a determination that the defendant is not a member of a criminal group. 75 Finally, nothing in the wording of Article 25(3)(c) suggests that it only incriminates aiding and abetting an individual. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis it may be concluded that Article 25(3)(d) closely resembles JCE inasmuch as it reflects the idea of furthering common purpose As observed by J. Ohlin, 'Joint Criminal Confusion ', 2009 New Criminal Law Review, no. 12, p. 412 liability, which has been at the core of JCE liability at the ICTY.
76 Both concepts emphasize subjective elements and not an objective contribution.
Yet, the subjective approach is also favoured based on the perceived need to avoid further fragmentation of international criminal law and any departure from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. When interpreting the concept of commission introduced in Article 25(3)(a), the Court should, it is contended, draw upon customary international law which clearly endorses the subjective approach based on the JCE. 77 Notwithstanding the appeal of this assertion, customary international law is a subsidiary source of law that can only be taken into account if: a) there is a lacuna; and b) it is not clear that the drafters of the Rome Statute created an independent body of law that must be interpreted independently. 78 The wording of Article 25(3)(a) manifestly rejects ICTY/R jurisprudence as a basis for interpreting the concept of commission, which is evident in the fact that it explicitly endorses the concept of indirect perpetration -a mode of liability not recognized as such by the ICTY and not applied by international criminal judiciary before the Rome Statute entered into force. The latter equally applies to reliance on customary international law as an interpretative tool. Werle, supra note 13, p. 176.
79
For an overview of cases before the ICTY/R that demonstrate certain elements of indirect co-perpetration theory, see Cassese's International Criminal Law, supra note 22, p. 179. Apart from the Stakic Trial Judgment, which was overturned on appeal, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR has not used the term indirect perpetration when assessing situations such as that found in the Seromba case, nor when convicting under JCE for crimes physically carried out by non-JCE members. See Goy, supra note 13, p. 40.
be interpreted to include common purpose liability akin to JCE (I or II), the drafters would have used the same terminology as in Article 25(3)(d) -and incriminated the commission of 'a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose'. Any interpretation reading common purpose liability into Article 25(3)(a) would violate the basic rule of interpretation -that differences in wording exist for a reason, i.e. that they reflect differences in content. 
The 'control of the crime' paradigm
However, it must be admitted that setting aside subjective theories and the JCE concept cannot automatically be interpreted as the legal basis for adopting the control over the crime theory.
81 Nevertheless, the dismissal of subjective theories coupled with the rejection of purely objective theories strongly speaks in favour of adopting a mixed, objective-subjective model of perpetration such as that expressed by control theory. Control of the crime theory, furthermore, provides for probably the most reasonable common denominator for different modes of principal liability specified in Article 25(3)(a), at least if subjective interpretation is rejected -it brings together, under the umbrella terms of 'control' and 'commission', several modes of conduct (act-domination in the case of individual commission, functional domination in the case of co-perpetration and will domination when it comes to indirect co-perpetration).
82 Evidently, control theory is based on the writings of the German scholar Roxin, i.e. on modern German theory and on just a handful of systems that follow it. Not only does this theory not form part of international customary law or general principles of law, but it is even questioned in the country of its origin.
83
Yet, contrary to Judge Van den Wyngaert's view that reliance on 'control of the crime' theory would be permissible only inasmuch as it qualified as a general principle of law in the sense of Article 21 (1) 86 Subsidiary and tertiary sources of law would, hence, only become relevant if the Statute could not be interpreted in a reasonable manner. It is to be emphasized that, while the Court strongly adheres to the principle of legality, thus rejecting the judicial creation of law, judicial interpretation remains necessary to interpret dogmatic concepts such as commission and this is where doctrine is indispensable. As noted by the European Court of Human Rights, '[i]n any system of law, including criminal law, however clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances'.
87 As long as the interpretation is foreseeable and accessible, it does not violate the principle of legality. 88 In fact, the ECHR has found that one of the circumstances making judicial interpretation reasonably foreseeable is the fact that such an interpretation was supported by a number of scholars at the relevant time of the commission of the crime. 89 Obviously, the ICC's interpretation of modes of liability, unlike interpretation according to the principles propounded by the ECHR, should be guided by the rule of strict construction and the favor rei principle. 90 Although this may not appear at first glance, the result of 'control of the crime' theory application seems to be in line with the rule of strict construction and the favor rei principle much more than the application of any subjective test. Grounding commission on the subjective state of mind potentially broadens the class of perpetrators and leaves Law School: Trials and Tribunals of Adjustment', (1968 
88
In the context of the European Convention, an interpretation may even be progressive. The ECHR emphasized that Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation, provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen (see, inter alia, S.W. v 
89
Jorgic v Germany, supra note 87, para. 107. This could well be the case here given the number of scholarly writings making 'control of the crime' theory reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Werle, supra note 57.
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Which is not the case before many national jurisdictions and the ECHR. room for manipulation 91 , whereas requiring control as an objective requirement in abstracto serves to restrict the reach of this, highest degree of individual criminal responsibility.
CONCLUSION
Several issues regarding modes of liability are still open for discussion and the debate is ongoing. This paper deals with only a fragment of this subject matter (that of the overarching theory), leaving the discussion of particularities of each mode of liability aside. In contrast to what some scholars and practitioners advance, objective and subjective elements of different modes of liability can only be ascertained following the determination of the guiding principles. In other words, one should first seek to answer whether Article 25(3) provides for a unitary or dualist approach and, if the dualist approach is accepted, where the line should be drawn between commission and accomplice liability. Certainly, there is merit to the argument that the Court should strive to achieve greater harmonization with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in order to avoid unnecessary fragmentation of international criminal law. Yet, this should not be done at the expense of the Court's internal consistency and coherence. Although the Court is not bound by its previous decisions, it may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions (Article 21(2)). As stated above, such a practice contributes to the development of a consistent and predictable body of international criminal law and consequently serves the principle of legality.
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The Court has so far persistently followed the path of control theory which, as explained above, can be viewed as coherent and grounded in the Statute. While minor aberrations from the main route can be seen as fine-tuning 93 , making what may be seen as a U-turn in this field could undermine the Court's legitimacy and its adherence to important general principles of international criminal law. The (appellate) judges of the ICC should keep this in mind when rethinking the content and scope of different modes of liability. 
